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Abstract-Network Mobility (NEMO), derived from Mobile
Internet Protocol version 6 (MIFV6) technology, has been
evolving and expanding in very rapidity manner across very
short period of time. ln MIPv6 technology, the Access Router(AR) plays important roles such as provide sessions connectivlty
and safe-guarding communications protocol. Whereas in NEMO,
the routers in the communication chains are essentially the
moving targets and hence the Mobite Router (MR). The Mi too,
inherits the basic functionalities of AR. In the basic MIpv6 and
NEMO modus operandi, when the Mobile Network Notes (MNN)
roamed away from home link and attached to some other foreign
link, the Ml\[Ns are also addressable via a secondary address
named as Care-of Address (CoA). The MNN essentially registered
its primary CoA to the router on its own home link and thus
registering the router to be its Home Agent (IIA). These
communication sets, lnd the ingredients of the communication
will be managed via Binding Updates (BU) and the Binding
Acknowledgemeat @Ack). Since the NEMO is using MIpv6 ai
the backbone, I\EMO also inevitably inherits many design
difliculties and problems that the MIpv6 seen. Sucb as using the
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) wifh end-to-end tunneling and
using nonce value within the BU to serve as part of the
aulhentication proc€ss and many more. fn this paper, we
illustrate the scenario of authentication problems- involving
NEMO movements and the flaw in security design. With the aim
of succeeding IPSec we then propose a much better solutlon
which is the use of Random Number, coupled with pKI concept.
fndac Terms*Network Mobility (I\[EMO), Mobile Network
Notes (MNN), Mobile Router (MR), Care-of Address (CoA),
Ilome Agent (IIA), Btnding Updates @U), Acknowledgement(BAck).
I. INrRoDUcrroN
Th" standard specification of MIFv6 [l] defined ther recommended communication protocols and the way how
2 sets of mobile notes shall be exchanging bits and bytes.
Whereas the standard documentation of NEMO [2] defined the
recornmended communication protocols and the way how a
MR shall be managed while interacting with MNNs.
Nevertheless in both MIPV6 and NEMO protocol sets, the
basic expectation is that the MNN is always expected to be
addressable at its home address, regardless of the current
location whether at home link or at foreign linlq and also being
protected and secured via the implementation of IpSec [l],[l0], [11]. Such security implementation is also applicable to
NEMO's MR. As because the MR is simply another MNN,
which is router-capable.
The term "Home Address" is the address which is being
allocated to the MNN while it is first booted at its home link
and is essentially a subnet IP address from the home link.
"Care-of Address", is another IP address being allocated by
the router, be it the AR or the MR the MNN attached to while
moving away from home into a foreign subnet. Correspondent
Node (CN) is any Node, regardless fix of mobile node that is
communicating with the MNN.
While moving away from home, regardless of under MIPV6
or NEMO condition, the MNN will have to establish a
"Binding" that will associate the HoA and CoA together so
that the communications from CN to HoA wiil b€ able to reach
the new CoA. The control messages that resulting the Binding
will be exchanged via the BU-BAck protocol sets. The end
result of the Binding will see the Home Agent being formed as
the MNN requesting the router at its home link to manage theBU and thereafter communications between CN->HA-
>MNN(HoA-CoA).
For both MIPv6 and NEMO, the standard specification
recommended the usage of IPSec to secure the
communications between HA and MNN via the usage of
IPSec with IPv6 Encapsulation [U,[2]. The full functionality
ofIPv6 Encapsulation and IP ESP can be found in [14], [15].
The objective for NEMO is to ensure session continuity for
all the mobile nodes (or Mobile Host) in the mobile nefworks
even when the MR has changed its physical attachment point
[3], [4]. On top of that, the MR is also responsible in
distributing subnet prefixes such as described in [7]. The
standard protocol has also pointed out that in order to achieve
the session connectivity, one of the basic requireinents is to
setup bi-directional tunnel between the MR and its HA [2]. In
which, a MIPv6 compliance HA can also be a NEMO HA.
The bi-directional tunnel is used as a tunnel for MR to inform
HA of its attachment via BU.
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As shown in Figure l, an example showed that MRI moved
from one point of attachment to another point of atlachment.
Let's assume that a new CoA is assigred upon the completion
of roaming. MRI will have to send BU back to it's HA, which
this BU contains the CoA being given to the MRl at new
location. The HA upon receiving the BU, will echo back the
BAck to MRI and hence setting up a new the bi-directional
tunnel. Until the new tunnel is setup and roaming completed,
note that the old tunnel is still a valid tunnel. The MR will also
aggregate the new prefixes information within the network to
HA.
The HA will then setup and forward all packets destined to
the nodes within MRI via this tunnel after authentication is
being done in the BU-BAck exchange [l], [2]. The MRl will
then reverse tunnel and respond to all packets' source
addresses belonged to nodes within the mobile network
prefixes. The HA, will then de-capsulate and forward packets
to the CN. As shown in Figure 1, the scenario described is the
simplest NEMO communications setup [2].
When CN sends a packet to a node that is located within the
mobile network, this packet will be routed into HA, of which
the HA will have the binding of the mobile router and
subsequently the aggregated prefix and hence the node. This is
the simplest communication model as pointing the CN directly
link to same HA. The scenario will be more complicated if
assuming CN has some sub layering of nested loop and hence
CN need to link with its own HA (and this CN-HA is a
different MR-HA) as in Figure 2.
When a HA received a packet that is meant for a node
within a mobile network, the HA tunnels the packet to the
MR's CoA. The MR will then de-capsulate the tunneled
packet and verifu that the source address on the outer IPv6
header is the HA's address. It also has to verify that the
destination address on the inner IFv6 header belongs to one of
its Mobile Network Prefixes before forwarding to the mobile
network.
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A rather more complicated implementation of such kind can
be seen in Figure 2. The diagram has shown that how
communication can be done to a q?ical MNN. There are 3
level of protocol encapsulation anyhow, which are HAI-
>HA2; HA2->MR2 and MR2->MR3. (Assuming that MR can
also act as HA in the situation for instance in the event that the
HA2 is malfunction.)
Also can be seen in Figure 3, the communication between
CN and MNN has to be thru different level of protocol
encapsulation after the MR3 has traveled to different link
network. Such implementation can best be applied in a moving
train, or moving bus in a city, of which the individual bus can
have a router installed and hence acted like a mobile router;
and the MNN will be imagine as a mobile PDA caried by
passengers.
II. PROBLEMSTATEMENT
The statement as below:
MNNI : AA:88::22:10
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When CN sends a packet to a node that is located within the
mobile network, this packet will be routed into HA, of which
the HA will have the binding of the mobile rourer and
subsequently the aggregated prefix and hence the node.
<quoted : RFC3775/MC3963>
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When the CN is communicating to MNN/MR/HA, both
parties had already agreed upon certain security rules for the
encryption/decryption portion. These rules are called Security
Association (SA), of which is actually a database that contains
array of encryption standards and algorithms such as Advance
Encryption Standard (AES), Dara Encryption Standards (DES)
and/or with various encryption algorithms such as Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC), Electronic Coke Book (ECB) and
many more variants such as Counter Mode Encryption with
CBC-MAC authentication (CCM).
As an example shown in Figure 4, the first MNN may have
the capability of supporting up to 6 different type of SA, while
as for the second MNN which is less capable, may only
support up to 3 sets of SA.
One of the ineffectiveness can be seen during the process
where both MNNs will need to sync up which suitable security
standards to be employed. MNNI will typically take is first
standard, as in the example shown in Figure 4 as AES, and ask
MNN2 if MNN2 has AES too. The answer is obviously
MNN2 does not support AES. MNNI will then move on the
second standards which is AES-ECB and the process continue
until finally both found a match which is borh MNNs
supporting AES-CCM standards. This type of scanning and
I
zA
(
comparing processes will introduce processing overhead.
This is a typical protocol especially for IPSec. The IpSec
implementation is not entirely error free and had exposed
numerous security threats such as being widely discussed in
technical forum, the IETF working groups as well as many
research and conference papers publication. [5], [8], [9], [13]
The IPSec is the current proposed security system that is
being proposed in NEMO and MIPv6 protocol. BU and BAck
can be secured by using any ofthe security design such as the
recommended IPSec or altemative security design system such
as PKI [6].
Figure 4 : Sample of SA profles bet!reon 2ltilNg
Now, imagine of what happen if a CN is still
communicating to MNN/IvIR, and because CN does not have
the visibility of the location of MNN, CN is still sending
packets to MNN's Home Agent (as shown in Figure 3) with
MR3's movement is transparent to the CN. What CN really
cares is thal CN will send packets to CN's HAI and it is this
HAI that then establish associations and encapsulate the
packets to the MNN's HA2 (and hance reaching to MM),
which is located in another side of the world. The HA2 then
relay the packets to MR3 which associated with the MR2. The
HA2 itself, contains the binding of MR2-HA2 and then this
MR2 decapsulate the packets to route to MR3 which contained
the MNN. All communication seemed perfect except that, in
Figure 3, the MR3 had just roamed away.
Just imagine, if there is multiple nested loop of mobile
networks, meaning for instance another scenario of MRI
attiached to another MR2 and MR2 in turns attached to another
MR3 and this MR3 in turn attached ro another MR4 and so on
.... There will be a lot of protocol overheads just to
encapsulate/decapsulate, and the each layer of tIA-MRs will
have veri$ and authenticate each other. This type of
communication model will not be a problem for a l-layer
NEMO communication such as shown in Figure l. But in real
life scenario, the situation as illustrated in Figure I does not
always happen. There will be a lot of IPSec tunnels that carries
BU/BAck exchanges just for each layer and for the BU to
provide authentications as scenario of Figure 3 in more reality.
Technically speaking, the industrial specifications
(RFC3775 and RIC3963) suggested in using BU and BAck as
a form to achieve authentication, whenever a MR./MNN
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roamed to another subnet and given a new CoA [l]' [2]. The
BU will contain old CoA and then being mapped by a new
CoA, hence informing the other communication node that it
has changed the location. After the exchanged of BU-BAck
(because BU-BAck contains some parameter that later being
used in MIPv6 protocol as a way to authenticate during each
roaming), the HA can then authenticate the MR that has new
CoA, is indeed the genuine MR before the roaming happened.
Since the BU is sent via an IPSec tunnel, no attacker can
hack into the lPSec tunnels and possibly alter the
address/content of the packets and hence redirecting the
packets [l]. But this is all possible for authentication ONLY
after IPSec tunnel has been setup, simply because the BU is
hidden and protected behind the lPSec capacity.
As we have just described that under fast or constant
roaming situation, the setting up and tearing down of bi-
directional tunnel for IPSec to be applicable, thru multiple
layers (nested loop), is indeed an implementation too
expensive under such rapid changes. For each movement, the
node will have to wait multi-layer of communication (or
setting up tunnels and exchanging BU-BAck) until reaching
authentication part, will be too slow and degrading overall
system performance. One may argue that these inef{iciencies
will be insignificant when coupled with powerful hardware
processor, but we can still make a different by exploring an
altemative solution which is much cheaper to be implemented.
III. THE SOLUTION
The new idea we propose here to tackle the aforementioned
problem (o achieve faster authentication without
compromising security design as a whole), is to have each
mobile device that comply with NEMO protocol to add a
simple authentication mechanism protocol. This authentication
mechanism is the implernentation of a standalone array of
Random Number (RN) in NEMO' The RNs are associated
with each Correspondent Nodes that the device has exchanged
with. This solution is very simple and efficient to implement.
Technically speaking this implemeatation is possible
consider below situation:
MNN sets up bi-directional tunnels with CN as opposed to
Figure2, and enjoying communications with CN- Note that this
bi-directional tunnel can still use [PSec as security
implementation as IPSec does not conflict with our proposed
solution at this stage.
Upon the communication has established the MR3/MR2
(that the MNN connected to) generates and exchange a truly
RN value which identifying this transaction of communication,
to the HA2 they associated with. The HA2 stores tlis
standalone array of RN for future reference. The RN can be
generated using either hardware or software implementation
and the metrics of the MNN will look like in Figure 5. We
proposed the metrics shall be kept within the each mobile host.
Figure 5 : Sample metrics of RN on MNN
As seen in Figure 5 and using a 64-bits RN Value, assuming
that this metrics is managed by CN, whenever the
authentication process is kick-started, the CN will map the RN
Value within the metrics that the CN managed and verify
against the value given by the MR. The time is the time-toJive
(TTL) of which the life time of the random number.
Applying RN in scenario of Figure 3, when MR3 roamed to
another region with different zubnet, and atiached with HA3,
the MR3 will just need to notify HA2 via HA3 and provide
with the RN. HA2 will then take the RN, map with the metrics
database it has, and find a match, and then concluded that the
MR3 is a genuine MR3 that he was talking previously, and
now at a different location. The entire idea is that for the
MNNs which is compliant to NEMO protocol, just to safe-
keep RN value and being processes at later stage.
The BU/BAck exchange is still important in the overall
NEMO system protocol, but with this idea, the BU can come
at the later stage and the nodes do not have to wait until the
BU stage to get authenticated. This is also critical in nested
layer.
One may have doubts on how can the integrity and the
exchange process of the RN be secured without using IPSec?
Echoing the concept of introducing PKI for security desigrt
[6], the exchange and updates ofthe RN can be done via PKI
mechanism [12] such as shown in Figure 6.
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We proposed to use PKI mechanism in disribution of the
RN Key. Below are the descriptions on how PKE mechanism
can be applied to scenario as illustrated in Figure3:
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l) The MR will request the public Key of CN from a trusted
CA. This request will have an association to Time (tl).
2) CA responded to the MR by encrypfing the message
using CA's private key. This way the MR can decrypt the
message using CA's public key which is openly available. The
message contains CN's public key and the original request
from MR, and the time stamp. This is to allow MR compared
the message and hence authenticate the integrity of the
message.
3) MR can then encrypt message (which is the RNI being
generated) with CN's public key. This message will contain
the MR's identifier as well.
4) CN decryprs the message using its own private Key and
retrieves the MR's identifier as well as the RNl. CN will send
request to the fusted cA in order to obtain MR's public Key.
This step is similar to how MR obtained CN's public Key.
5) CA will perform identical process (similar to step 2)
which is to deliver MR's Public Key to CN.
6) CN can now encrypt a new message to MR, containing
the RNI as well as newly generated Secret Key. When the
message arrived io M&
7) By now the Secret Key has been securely shared between
MR and CN and the irther communications done between
MR and CN will be via this symmetric encryption.
8) CN decrypts the message via the Secret Key and in return
will start using this Secret Key for further communications to
MR.
From the illustrations shown in Figure6, the concept is as
simple as, to setup central and trusted Certificate Authority
(mostly to be managed by the Internet Service provider). Only
simple block encryption is needed and this system,s strength is
maximizing the PubliciPrivate Key Exchange mechanism to
distribute the RN. Step 3 and Step 6 proof that the RN being
used for authentication purposes and both MR and CN can
safely verify each's identity.
In simple, our new idea is to enhance a fast authentication
method whereby the HA will firstly store RN when the
MR/MNN booted up. And the HA will exchange and compare
the RN of each transaction of roaming for authentication,
whenever the associated MR/MNN moved or roamed away.
Once the same RN is matched and the verification of genuine
and accuracy oftransaction can be claimed and authenticated.
From there on, Step 7 and Step 8 will only need a faster
cryptography mechanism which is Symmetric Encryption, as
compared to the IPSec.
IV. stNprns
In terms of NEMO protocol efficiency, especially in space
of the security design, our proposal provided a faster and
easier authentication method.
This idea can be implemented in either software or hardware
level. As for software implementation, a mathematical
Random Number Generator can be written and embedded into
as part of the NEMO protocol standards. As in hardware's
perspective, one can implement this Random Number feature
and stored in flash memory of the hardware chip. Nowadays in
the embedded or consumer electronic markets, hardware chips
often already provided Random Number generation
capabilities.
The randomness will base on the length of the key and
technically speaking, a randomness of 64-bits will already
sufficiently provide good randomness. And depending on
implementation the Random Number (the key) can be
expanded into l28bits. Currently, by following the NEMO
specification the authentication can be done in lpSec's
Authentication Header, or via a nonce (also known as a
random number) that associated with BU. In order to keep
overall BU size to be minimum, this nonce has a limited
size of 16 bits and has to be used in association with
cookies of BU. So as opposed to our 64-bit RN proposal,
our solution will be more secure in term of the advantage
in the size of RN. On top of that, our solution also make
authentication achievable at early stage rather than after
BU-BAck protocol exchanged. We can also argue that
128-bit RN may provide even better randomness, but we
shall also consider the transactions of the communications
whether 128-bit processing will defer performance over
smaller scale of transactions.
In long run, our new idea can also provide a chance to
eliminate the use of nonce in BU as we foresee in future the
challenges of reduciag usage of BU under frequent NEMO-
MR-switching and intense nested looping environment.
V. CONCLUSION
We showed the current standard specification is especially
under intense vulnerability under nested looping condition, of
which the efficiancy of the protocol as a whole is being
dropped.
We also proposed a solution for faster and simpler
authentication via Random Number verification method
coupled with PKI mechanism to exchange the Random
Number. Once, RN being used and successfully provided a
channel for authenfication for both MR and CN or even MNN
within the MR, tle rest of the communications between two
parties can be via a faster Symmetric Encryption as opposed to
the slower IPSec.
This mechanism is fast, simple and cheap to implement, and
do not have to rely on the tedious bi-directional tunnel that can
accommodate the BU-BAck exchanges and at the same time
also achieve authentication objective. Most importantly,
achieve authentication before reaching the BU-BAck
algorithm.
While compare with the current NEMO standards of
proposing to use BU-BAck's 'Nonce" (also another kind of
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random value) together with BU's cookies as an authentication
method, our idea provide a faster and earlier authentication
exchange methodology, rather then slower and later
authentication.
By implementing this new idea, the BU-BAck exchange
time at protocol and system level will become shorter because
the authentication portion is already done ahead and hence
reduce overall protocol processing time.
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